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We  propose  a  model  of  the  European  gas  market  where  the  risk  that  Russian 
deliveries  are  interrupted  is  endogenized.  While  Russia’s  attempts  to  buy 
considerable parts of the European downstream industry have faced strong political 
opposition,  we  argue  that  Russian  participation  in  the  downstream  market  would 
decrease consumer prices and increase the security of supply. 
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I. Introduction  
 
Russia has become the largest supplier of the European gas market and, as it the 
largest reserves, its market shares certainly will not decrease for many years. This 
dependence on Russia is worrying, even more so since, for four days in January 
2006, it partly halted its deliveries to Western Europe in order to discipline the transit 
country Ukraine and enforce higher prices for its gas supplied to Ukraine.
1 
 
On the other hand, Russia’s (Gazprom’s) tremendous profits, based on the oil and 
gas price increases in the last few years, allows it to invest in the downstream sector 
in Western Europe. Gazprom’s attempts, however, to buy into the European Gas 
Industry have encountered strong political opposition. So its shares in the European 
gas industry are rather restricted (see Table 1). But why be afraid? Why shouldn’t 
Gazprom become one of the major European pipelilnes, comparable with Ruhrgas 
(E.ON) or GdF? In this paper, we will argue that competition as well as security of 
supply can be improved. 
 
We  need  not  assume  that  Gazprom  is  an  additional  player  in  the  European  gas 
market;  it  is  sufficient  to  assume  that  it  substitutes  (buys)  one  of  the  existing 
European players (or some of the national pipelines). The reason for the increased 
competition is that the producer Gazprom will deliver according to its marginal costs 
while the pure traders will deliver according to the price in the upstream market. A 
trader Gazprom will (partially or totally) avoid double marginalization. 
 
Security of supply is increased because of two components, one “inside” our model 
and  one  “outside”.  The  outside  argument  is  that  Gazprom’s  affiliates  are  under 
Western  legislation;  illegal  practices  in  Europe  or  even  hostile  measures  by  the 
producer Gazprom are no longer without an effective reply as its property in Europe 
is  effectively  held  hostage.  From  inside  the  model  the  argument  is  a  bit  more 
complex. So let us first outline the model we have in mind. 
 
                                            
1 This was not the first interruption because of problems with a transit country. In February 2004, the 
pipeline via Belarus was closed for one day. 
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Currently, the European gas industry is (hopefully) transitioning to more competition. 
The  European  commission  and  also  the  governments  of  the  individual  European 
countries try to break up old monopoly structures on the wholesale as well as on the 
retail level. An important instrument for this purpose is the unbundling and regulation 
of transport (Bolle and Breitmoser, 2006). In some cases (Germany, Denmark, and 
other countries) gas release auctions should support the emergence of strong new 
competitors  (Bolle  and  Breitmoser,  2007).  We  assume  that,  as  a  result  of  such 
attempts, competition among pipelines will increase: in the downstream market as 
well as in the upstream market where these pipelines compete for contracts with the 
producers.  Currently,  the  big  importing  pipelines  like  Ruhrgas  seem  to  be  in  a 
comfortable  position  in  both  markets  but  we  expect  this  advantage  to  cease.  An 
additional reason for this development is that two of the current sources of European 
gas supply are going to fade away, namely Dutch gas and domestic production (in 
some European countries). So the remaining producers (Russia with Gazprom as the 
only exporter, Norway under the leadership of Statoil) will gain market power. Other 
producers  of  rising  importance  may  be  Algeria,  and  several  small  LNG  based 
imports. The model we propose is adapted to such a future scenario. It provides the 
importing pipelines with less and the producers with more market power than they 
currently appear to have. 
 
Our model of the European gas market has the following properties. In the first stage, 
the producers Pj determine their capacities x
j, j = 1, …, m, and j=R=Gazprom. Then 
the  traders  Ti,  i  =  1,  …,  n  compete  for  these  capacities  as  “price  takers”.  If 
i=R=Gazprom is also a trader, it does not compete for these capacities but will be 
served by extra capacities which Gazprom has reserved for its trader. Therefore TR 
takes into account Gasprom’s expected marginal costs  R c . The traders form tight 
oligopolies  on  each  regional  (downstream)  market,  but  in  their  (upstream)  supply 
market there are “many” of them compared with the “few” producers. Admittedly, this 
is a strong simplification which allocates “market power” mainly to the producers. A 
“price taking” trader offers quantities in the downstream market as if the price in its 
supply market were fixed, i.e. while acting strategically in the downstream market 
they act non-strategically in the upstream market. The reason for this, the multiplicity 
of regional markets, is not modelled explicitly. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that  there  is  one  downstream  market  with  atomistic  demand.  Note  that  this   5
downstream  market  is  a  wholesale  market  with  the  pipelines  on  one  side  and 
retailers and large industrial customers on the other. 
 
Producers  and  traders  sign  long-term Take  or  Pay  (ToP)  contracts.  Producer  j  is 
obliged to supply trader j with a certain quantity xji for which i is obliged to pay pxji 
whether or not he takes it. There are additional provisions, in particular an oil and/or 
coal price dependency of p, the opportunity to buy certain limited additional quantities 
at  an  increased  price,  and  perhaps  fines  in  the  case  of  non-delivery  (depending 
somewhat  on  whether  non-delivery  is  caused  by  “force  majeur”).  Limited  re-
negotiations are possible in cases of fundamental market disruptions. It is well-known 
that ToP contracts have such clauses but details are not available. In the following 
we want to concentrate on long-term contracts between producers and traders with a 
given price. The problem of non-delivery is simplified and attributed to Russia only. 
 
Non-delivery may have technical reasons. It may be due to terrorist attacks on the 
pipelines or production facilities, or it may be caused by quarrels arising from contract 
interpretation between the producer and the trader or with transit countries as in the 
case of Ukraine. For the time being Russia is the most dependent on transit through 
third  countries’  territories  and  is,  of  all  producers,  most  endangered  by  terrorist 
attacks. Therefore we disregard the risk of non-delivery for all other producers and 
concentrate solely on Russia. We assume that there is an endogenously determined 
probability  a  that  Russia  will  not  deliver.  This  will  lead  to  a  reduction  in  price  of 
Russian gas. 
 
In  order  to  determine  a  we  interpret  all  the  above  mentioned  risks  as  (random) 
additional  costs  for  Russian  deliveries.  In  every  case,  Russia  decides  whether  to 
deliver  under  such  increased  costs.  In  the  model,  we  use  as  a  criterium  for 
interruption of delivery whether costs are above the price of Russian gas. We could, 
of course, argue that Russia’s critical costs may be below this price (reputation as a 
tough negotiator with transit countries) or above this price (reputation for security of 
supply). Our assumption seems to be the reasonable compromise if one does not 
want to model such considerations explicitly. We will see that the result of Gazprom’s 
entrance as a trader in the downstream market is that – in the long-run – Gazprom 
will no longer sell quantities in the upstream market but distribute its gas solely via its 
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trade arm. The price q in the downstream market will decrease. As q > pR = price of 




In the next section, in order to show that we are not talking about hypothetical goals, 
we  report  about  Russia’s  (often  unsuccessful)  attempts  to  buy  into  the  European 
downstream market. In Section III we will set up the model. In the fourth section the 
determination of a will be described, in the fifth section the supply of the downstream 
market will be derived, initially only with traders who buy in the upstream market and 
then also with Gaszprom as a trader. In both cases demand functions for quantities in 
the upstream market will be derived. In the sixth section the equilibrium supply of the 
producers will be determined. The seventh section will offer some rough estimates 
which  are  necessary  for  the  evaluation  of  the  model.  The  last  section  is  the 
conclusion where we also report about related literature. 
 
II. Gazprom in the European Downstream Market 
 
A number of attempts were recently undertaken by Gazprom to obtain direct access 
to  desired  markets  in  Europe.  This  goal  is  supported  by  Gazprom’s  tremendous 
profits. From 2005 to 2006 Gazprom’s export earnings increased by 44 percent: from 
€19.0 billion to €27.3 billion. (Neftegas.ru, 2006). With the recent announcement of a 
€9 billion rise in its revenue in 2007 (WGI, 2007), the company has even more money 
for an expansion into European markets. 
 
The large European markets (Italy, Germany, France and the UK) are of supreme 
priority  within  Russia’s  strategy.  When  attempting  to  penetrate  these  foreign 
downstream  markets,  however,  Gazprom  –  different  from  E.ON  or  GdF  –  faces 
strong political opposition. In Great Britain, Gazprom established a 100% subsidiary 
in 1999 (Gazprom Marketing and Trading), which owns all the licenses for gas supply 
to industrial end users. Since then, a slow and gradual takeover policy in the British 
market  can  be  observed.  Gazprom’s  interest  in  buying  the  UK  gas-distribution 
                                            
2 But even if q were to decrease below pR – could this be a disadvantage? Transaction costs left aside, 
it  cannot  be  worse  for  Western  countries  than  q  >  pR  because  Western  countries  could  offer 
compensation to transit countries or Gazprom in order to avoid an interruption.   7
company Centrica
3 in the first half of 2006 (valued at over €15 billion) was thought to 
be the most significant step of this policy. Although no concrete bid emerged, the 
mere possibility caused the British government to immediately undertake defensive 
actions. UK business law allows the government to intervene in mergers if there is an 
"exceptional  public  interest".  Finally,  an  unspecified  governmental  security 
consideration blocked the potential takeover of Centrica by Gazprom. 
 
Russia still has openly set the goal to hold 20 percent of the British gas market by 
2015. Thus, other acquisition attempts were undertaken. In January 2006, the press 
reported  on  Gazprom’s  interest  in  Scottish  Power  (that  is,  5  million  customers  in 
Britain), but without any real action to be observed. In June 2006, Gazprom bought 
the small company Pennine Natural Gas, engaged in retail gas trading to 900 end 
users  (including  a  few  major  companies).  It  also  entered  into  an  agreement  with 
Natural  Gas  Shipping  Services  Ltd  for  administering  Gazprom’s  supply  to  UK 
customers (Russia Newswire, 2006). 
 
Gazprom’s penetration of the German downstream sector dates back to 1993 when 
Wingas – the second largest gas distributor in Germany – was established as a joint 
venture of Wintershall and Gazprom. Its original capital distribution was 65 percent 
(Wintershall) and 35 percent (Gazprom). Since 2006, each partner holds 50 percent 
with a majority of one additional share held by Wintershall. Redistribution of forces 
took  place  following  an  asset  swap:  Wintershall  received  a  35-percent  stake
4  in 
Gazprom's  Yuzhno  Russkoe  gas  field  in  Western  Siberia,  while  Gazprom  has 
increased  its  share  in  Wingas  (Russ  Oil-Gas,  2006).  Thus  a  corporate  oriented 
approach  may  be  the  only  way  Gazprom  can  gain  access  to  certain  European 
markets in the short run. Gazprom’s deal in July 2006 with another German energy 
concern – E.ON – may result in the strengthening of its downstream business in 
Hungary. E.ON gets 25 percent minus one share in the Yuzhno Russkoe field, while 
Gazprom receives 50 percent minus one share in Hungarian E.ON Foldgaz Storage 
and Foldgaz Trade and 25 percent plus one share in E.ON Hungaria (Russ Oil-Gas, 
2006). This swap is still subject to approval by regulators.  
 
                                            
3 Centrica, as UK’s largest gas supplier, has market shares of 60 percent in the household sector and 
15 percent in the market for industrial and commercial customers. 
4 Only 25 percent of those stocks have voting rights. 
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As of September 2006, Italian Eni and Gazprom have been discussing a strategic 
partnership envisaged to involve Eni into exploration and production in Russia, in 
return for  Gazprom  being  allowed  to  sell  gas  directly  to  end  users  in  Italy  (EBR, 
2006b). These proposals have faced opposition from Italian regulators. Gazprom had 
already held talks to acquire two of Eni’s sales subsidiaries (Snam Rete Gas and 
EniPower), but in vain. Gazprom was successful, however, in the Italian retail sector 
in  November  2006,  by  signing  a  collaboration  deal  with  the  supplier  Gas  Plus 
intended to facilitate the distribution of Russian gas in Italy (EBR, 2006a). 
 
In Portugal, Gazprom is relying upon an investment strategy. In November 2006 it 
acquired a stake in a holding company that owns 31.6 percent in Galp Energia, the 
Portuguese corporation with a strong presence in gas distribution across the Iberian 
Peninsula.  Gazprom's  French  strategy  stands  in  sharp  contrast to  this.  Despite a 
long-standing  relationship  with  GdF,  it  has  stated  that  it  will  compete  directly  for 
French customers. No details have emerged (ERB, 2006a). In 2004, Gazprom did 
not succeed in a public tender in Romania for the acquisition of 51 percent the two 
regional gas distributors, Distrigaz Nord and Distrigaz Sud (Ionesen, 2004). 
 
All this shows how large Gazprom’s interest is to expand downstream. In this paper, 
we argue that such an expansion is also in the best interest of Europe – even without 
taking  into  account  Russia’s  alternatives  if  it  were  to  be  prevented  entering  the 
European downstream market. Europe’s interest in security of supply is not stronger 
than Russia’s interest in “security of demand”, which could be ensured by a stake in 
the European downstream market. Currently, Gazprom is seeking new markets – 
North America and China. 
 
III. The model 
 
We have producers P1, …, Pm and PR = Gazprom. Producers’ marginal (long term) 
production costs c1, … cm, are constant. Russia, however, may bear additional costs. 
The reason is that there is, for example, the possibility of a quarrel about transition 
fees between Gazprom and a transit country. Say, the transit country demands a 
certain fee, expressed as a share of the gas transported, and, when negotiations fail, 
simply takes this part. Russia’s reaction may be further negotiations, sanctions of all   9
kinds or, as ultima ratio, no longer feeding gas into the respective pipeline. Whether 
Russia adopts this ultimate measure will certainly depend on the respective costs of 
continued delivery and interruption of supply. So Gazprom’s costs of delivery cR are a 
random variable, the value of which is determined only after all contracts have been 
concluded. In the last stage of our game (the third stage), after cR is determined by 
chance, Gazprom decides whether to deliver. Viewed from earlier stages, there is 
only a probability  a that deliveries are interrupted. For the sake of simplicity, this 
interruption is assumed to be a full interruption. 
 
One may argue that a transit country would take into account decreased or increased 
criteria of interruption by decreasing or increasing its demands. This may be true but 
it would not completely offset the derived effects. For the sake of simplicity, we do not 
include the transit countries as players in our model. 
 
In the second stage of the game, which describes the downstream market, there are 
traders T1, … Tn and (possibly) TR = Gazprom. The traders Ti supply quantities xi+xi
R 
and TR the quantity xR to the downstream spot
5 market which is described by a linear 
(inverse) demand function 
 
(1)  q = a – b(x + x
R+xR)     or     q = a – bx   if Gazproms deliveries are interrupted, 
 














 and xR = 0 if Gazprom is not a trader. The traders buy 
xj+xj
R  non-strategically  under  the  assumption  of  given  prices  (p,  pR)  and  sell 
strategically  in  the  downstream  market.  Remember  that  we  rationalized  these 
differing attitudes with the fact that there are many regional downstream markets with 
few competitors, while altogether, the number of traders is large compared to the 
number of producers. 
 
 The  traders’  supply  in  the  downstream  market  determines  their  demand  in  the 
upstream market. This market is described by an oligopoly of producers who are 
faced with (inverse) demand functions 
                                            
5  Currently  these  downstream  markets  with  retailers  and  large  industrial  firms  as  customers  are 




(2)  p = f(x, x
R, a) 
 
(3)  pR = g(x, x
R, a) 
 



















j = supply of producer j to the upstream market, 
i x  and 
R
i x  demand of trader i in the upstream market, and a = probability of Russian 




In the following we want to determine the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this 
game by working backwards from Stage 3 to Stage 1. 
 
IV. Stage 3: Security of supply  
 
After all long-term contracts have been concluded, Gazprom’s costs cR of delivery 
are determined. To fix ideas let us assume that production costs in a narrow sense 
are  as  expected  but  that  there  are  random  costs  connected  with  transit  through 
countries  with  which  disputes  may  escalate  to  the  point  where  these  countries 
unilaterally take as much gas from the pipeline as they claim to be their adequate 
transition fee. Thus  cR  is  random and  Gazprom  has  to decide whether  to  deliver 
under such conditions or to stop feeding gas into this transition route. For the sake of 
simplicity we do not model restricted flows after certain pipelines have been closed 
but  assume  a  complete  stop  of  Russian  deliveries.  In  particular,  this  means  that 
Gazprom cannot decide to deliver to its own trade arm (if it exists) while interrupting 
deliveries  to  all  other  contract  partners.  We  thus  avoid  a  lengthy  discussion  on 
distributed effects and rationing rules. 
 
Gazprom’s profit from delivering gas is  
 
(4)   G
R = (pR –cR)x
R 
 
if it is not a trader and    11
(5)   G
R
 = (pR – cR)x
R +(q – cR)xR 
 
if it is. So, if Gazprom is not a trader it will deliver gas as long as  
 
(6)  cR < pR =  R c ~ . 
 

















In both cases a probability  
 
(8)  ( ) R
c








 results that gas deliveries from Russia will be interrupted. f(cR) is the density of cR. 
Viewed from earlier stages, Gazprom’s expected profit is 
 
(9)  ( ) R
c
R





V. Stage 2: The downstream market 
 
Let us now investigate the downstream market. Note that the traders i = 1, …, n do 
not assume that they have influence on prices p, pR. For them, these prices are only 
unit costs of the quantities they want to sell in the downstream market. They have 
rational expectations about the resulting a but they do not assume that they have 
influence on a (i.e. on  R c ~ ) either. Only TR decides about xR as if he had influence on 
a. TR does not buy in the upstream market; his costs are Gazprom’s marginal costs 
cR. The traders sell their gas on a spot market with a price q determined by (1). In the 
following,  we determine the Cournot equilibrium in the downstream market with n 
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traders having costs p and pR when buying their gas and (in the other case) a trader 
TR who has costs cR. 
 
The traders i = 1, …,n have ordered quantities xi of non-Russian gas and  R
i x  of 
Russian gas. The latter is delivered only with probability 1 - a. If Gazprom is not a 
trader this results in profits 
 




i i i p x p x bx bx a x x G - - - - + - = a 1  
           ( ) [ ] p x bx a x i i - - +a . 
 
The best responses of traders i are derived from 
 








i - - - + - + - + - - =
¶
¶
a a 1   = 0, 
  






i p x x b x x b a
x
G
- + - + - - =
¶
¶
a 1         = 0. 
 
By adding up (12) for all i we get  
 
(13)  ( ) R









which will serve as the inverse demand function for Russian gas in the upstream 
market. By adding up (11) for all i we get  
 
(14)     ( ) ] 1 [
1 R x x b
n
n
a p a - +
+
- = , 
 
which describes the inverse demand function of non-Russian gas in the upstream 
market.
6 
                                            
6 Though x and x
R are given and therefore (when Gazprom is not a trader) q is determined, the traders 
act as if they could influence q by the quantities they supply. Keep in mind that there may be many   13
 
If Gazprom is a trader we have to substitute in (10) x
R by  x
R+xR. Then we can 
compute the best responses of traders i as in (11) and (12). The best response xR is 
determined by maximizing (9) with G
R from (9) and (5) and  R c ~  from (7). In order to 







R c  instead of p, pR., a, x, x
R,  R c . Taking into account the definition 
of  R c ~ we get 
 













(16)  ( ) R R
c












the conditional expectation of cR.
7 Note that, when deriving (15), we took into account 
the influence of xR on a . (15), however, shows that this influence does not play any 
role except in the determination of 
'
R c . Similarly as above we determine the inverse 
demand functions: 
 
(17)  ( )
R R























C a p '
2
2





















                                                                                                                                        
regional markets. Assuming a given q would take away all market power from the traders because 
they would compete for quantities as long as q>p. 
7 Note that f(cR) is not without unit of measure. As f(cR) dcR has to be an element of IR, f’s dimension 
has to be quantity unit/money unit. 
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VI. The upstream market  
 
In this market the producers fix quantities under the assumption that prices result as 
described by the inverse demand function (14) and (15) or (17) and (18). Producer 




j(p – cj) 
 
if Gazprom is not a trader. Otherwise p is substituted by p
’. Note that x and x’ are the 
aggregate  quantities  provided  by  the  producers  (except  Gazprom)  and  that  all 
producers take into account their influence on a and  R c . When differentiating (19) 
with respect to x
j we have to take into account that p depends on x and a and that 
the latter depends on pR. So, the best response for j in the case that R is not a trader 










- -   = 0 
 
with c ~  from (7) and 
 
(21)  ( ) R























- -   = 0 






R’s profit in this case is given by (9) and (4), its derivative with respect to x











C p ,   15
where  R C  is defined by (16) with  R R p c = ~ . 
 












































and because of (24) 
 

















Interestingly, (13), (14), (25), and (26) show that p and pR depend on m but not on n. 
The reason is that n influences only the slope of the inverse demand functions with 
which the producers are confronted. 
 
Proposition 1: When Gazprom is a trader it will not be active (in the long run) in the 
upstream market. It will distribute its gas completely through its trade arm TR.  
 










































= = . 
 
Together with (18), (28) is an implicit function for q
’(x
’). The Implicit Function Theorem 
implies 
 
(29)  ( )
( ) ( ) ( )















After these preparatory computations we can determine the equivalent to (23), the 
aggregate best response conditions in the case where R is a trader. For this purpose 
we substitute in (20) p with p
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q f + - = b . 
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) ' ( ) ' ( 2 ) ' 1 ( 4
) ' 1 )( ' ' (
'
'
q f C q
q bx a
q f






From (31), (32),  and (19) follows 



























= ,   
and because of (15) with x
R=0 








Proposition 2: If 
0
R c c »  and if  a, a
’, b, b
’ are small enough, then the total quantity 
supplied to the downstream market increases when Gazprom becomes a trader. The 
market price q decreases and the security of supply  a - 1  increases. 
 
Proof: 
 If a, a
’, b, b
’ are small enough then  c c c c R R R » » »
0 ' . Setting, in addition, a, a
’, b, b’ 







) 1 )( 2 ( 2


























































Proposition 2 contains an important message but it is not completely new and it does 
not describe the case we are most interested in. In a hierarchy of monopolies or 
oligopolies consumers will be better off after partial (in this case) or complete vertical 
integration (Sprengler, 1950, Abiru, 1988). What is the result, however, if a, a
’, b, b’ 
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are  not  negligible?  In  principle,  (26)  and  (35)  give  us  the  answer,  but  the  result 
depends on a  and   b  as well as on the demand and cost parameters. In the next 
section we will calibrate our model and will thus be able to make some guesses. 
 
VII.  Calibration and evaluation of cases  
 
Russia has been delivering gas to Western Europe for 30 years. Only for one day in 
2004  and  for  four  days  in  January  2006,  part  of  its  supply  was  stopped.  These 
periods were too short to cause any shortages. Better, let us ask what the probability 
of an interruption for a period of, say, two months or longer could be. On the basis of 
30  years  experience  with  Russian  deliveries,  this  probability  would  be  practically 
zero. But times have changed and we have to expect a number of conflicts with 
transit countries who are also recipients of Russian gas and who are now expected to 
pay Western prices, the earlier the better. While this paper was written negotiations 
between  Gazprom  and  Belarus  ended  with  a  compromise  –  the  threat  of  an 
interruption of gas deliveries was explicitly mentioned, however, and in addition, it is 
not clear whether Belarus will be able to pay the compromise price. Only one week 
after this compromise was concluded, a quarrel concerning Russian transit fees for 
oil began. 
 
So, an a larger than zero seems to be appropriate. In our simple model, a does not 
depend on the length of the period, but rather must be reinterpreted in every case. 
For a period of, say, two months a is the probability of a complete shut-down. For a 
period  of  say,  five  years  it  is  the  share  of  (longer)  interruptions.  Let  us  view 
Gazprom’s situation as intermediate between the old secure regime and a completely 
insecure  situation  as,  for  example,  pipeline  transport  in  Iraq.  Perhaps  a  bit 
exaggerated guess is  a = current probability (share) of interruption = 0.05. 
 
In the insurance business the distribution of damage claims is often described by an 
exponential distribution; if Gazprom’s “damage” is its additional costs, we have 
 
(36)  CR = CR
0 + e,  
 
(37)   f(e) = le
-le, l > 0,   19
with f describing the density of e.  
 
a = Prob (CR
0 + e >  05 . 0 )
~
= R C  means 
 





















R R C C -
= l , 
 
Presently, Russia sells its gas at about pR = 200 Euro/1000 m
3 or 2.3 cent/kwh (price 
at the German border) to several importing pipelines. CR
0 is about 0.7 cent/kwh
8. We 
identify the present  R C ~  with pR = 2.3 cent/kwh (Russia isn’t a trader). Thus (39) 
implies 
 
(40)  cent kwh
kwh cent
/ 88 . 1
/ 6 . 1
20 ln
= = l . 
 
There are no really reliable estimates of gas demand. Liu (2004) finds long run price 
elasticities for natural gas between -0.78 and +0.08 for OECD countries. Holz et al. 
(2006) use an elasticity of -0.7 and Sagen and Tsygankowa (2006) use -0.5 in their 
respective models of the European Gas market. Let us take, as a rough estimate, h = 
-0.5  for  the  demand  of  retailers  and  large  industrial  consumers.  As  van  Damme 
(2004)  proposes  when  applying  a  linear  demand  model  to  the  Dutch  electricity 










1   where  q  =3  cent/kwh  is  the  current  price  in  the  (German)  downstream 
market  with  retailers  and  large  industrial  customers  (Pfaffenberger  and  Gabriel, 
2006). So we get a=9 cent/kwh. Note that, as long as costs are linear, we can look at 
each regional (national) downstream market independently from the others. We can 
                                            
8 Production costs depend on the gas field and on the development of transition fees CR
0. We choose 
a relative small value based on estimations by Hafner (no date), CR
0 may as well increase to 0.8 or 
even 1.0 cent/kwh. This would, however, not affect the qualitative results of our calculations. 
  20
imagine that certain quantities in the upstream market are earmarked for just this 
downstream market. The other possibility in evaluating the following computations is 
to assume that q = 3 cent/kwh is the price in the general European downstream 
market.  
 
For  the  following  computations,  we  assume  that  a=9  cent/kwh,  that 
kwh cent c c R / 7 . 0
0 = = , and that 
0
R R c c -  is distributed according to an exponential 
distribution with  cent kwh/ 88 . 1 = l . From the six equations (8), (13), (16), (21), (24), 
and (25) we compute the six variables bx
R, bx, pR,  b a, , R C  for the case where R is 
not a trader. Equivalently, we can determine the respective values for the case where 
R is a trader. Note that the two variants of our model need not reproduce the prices 
and  the  a   which  we  have  used  to  determine  the  demand  parameter  a  and  the 
distribution  parameter  l .  Our  model  tries  to  describe  a  competitive  future 
environment and not the present state which is characterized by nearly monopolistic 
retail  markets  and  by  downstream  markets  (in  Germany)  with  close  connections 
between  retailers  and  traders.  In  spite  of  this  argument  and  although  we  did  not 
expect it, Table 2 in the Appendix shows that the current price in the downstream 
market (» 3.0 cent/kwh) as well as that in the upstream market (» 2.3 cent/kwh) is 
reproduced for m = 3 (plus Russia) and n = 7 (the number of importing German 
pipelines), namely q = 3.17 cent/kwh and pR = 3.01 cent/kwh. We conclude that the 
downstream market may be more competitive than we thought. 
 
For  the  future  development  we  concentrate  on  numbers  of  producers  as  well  as 
traders  from  1  to  4.  The  current  situation  (in  Germany  as  well  as  some  other 
European countries) may be best described by m = 3 (plus Russia) while the number 
of  traders  is  rather  different  (practically  one  in  France  and  Denmark  and  larger 
numbers in Germany and England). We think, however, that the number of traders in 
the  regional  (national)  markets  will  become  more  homogeneous.  Domestic 
production  as  well  as  Dutch  deliveries  will  play  an  ever  smaller  role,  but  new 
competitors (Algeria, Middle East via LNG) may enter the market. In every case we 
found improvements with respect to downstream market prices as well as concerning 
the security of supply (Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix). 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
The security of supply has so far been discussed as an exogenous risk which has to 
be measured (Neumann, 2004; Jansen et al., 2004) and attempted to be handled by 
market instruments (Egenhofer et al., 2004). On the other hand, there are several 
models  of  the  European  gas  market  (Golembeck  et  al.,  1995;  Sagen  and 
Tsygankova, 2006; Holz et al., 2006), some under explicit consideration of security of 
supply  (Hoel  and  Strom,  1987;  Grais  and  Zheng,  1996),  and  others  with  transit 
countries as players in the game (von Hirschhausen et al., 2005; Ikonnikova, 2006). 
However,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  no  one  has  tried  to  evaluate  Russia’s 
attempts to also be a player in the downstream markets or has tried to endogenize 
the risk of the interruption of Russian deliveries.  
 
Our model is not about diversification of gas supply which, we think, is necessary and 
should mainly be improved by building LNG terminals. We propose a model of the 
European  gas  market  which  takes  into  account  that  Russian  deliveries  could  be 
interrupted,  mainly  due  to  quarrels  about  gas  prices  and  transit  fees  with  transit 
countries. Our model is only a rough approximation of the gas market but we think 
that it is sufficient to derive qualitative results for the cases of when Gazprom is a 
trader and when it is not. A more sophisticated model would take into account the 
nature  of  the  Take  or  Pay  contracts  which  (partly)  substitute  vertical  integration 
between the producers and the importing pipelines. 
 
The conclusion from our model is that a trader “Gazprom” in the downstream market 
would decrease the downstream market price heavily and that also the security of 
supply  increases.  Europe  can  only  profit  if  Gazprom  invests  in  the  downstream 
market. For this result it does not matter whether it buys existing traders (n ® n – 1) 
or builds its own trade arm (compare Tables 2 and 3/4). An additional advantage of 
Russian investment is that European countries are holding Russian property hostage. 
Unlawful behaviour of Gazprom could be replied by expropriation of its trade arm.  
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The derivation of (27)  
 
For the sake of simplicity we omit the primes of the symbols, i.e. we use x instead of 
x
’, etc. 
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with  (see (15) and (1)) 
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Using (1), (15), (17), (18) we get 
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Table 1: Fully owned firms and joint ventures of Gazprom in Europe. 
 “—“ = not applicable. “n/a” = data not available. “*” = Gazprom is a shareholder via 
WIEE, its 50-50 joint venture with Wintershall. 
Source: UCEPS (2004) and Wikipedia (2007) 
 








 Partner(s) of Gazprom 
Centrex Europe 
Energy & Gas 
100  —  Austria 




OMV (25.1%), Centrex 
(24.9%) 
Overgas Inc. AD  50  Overgas Holding AD (50%)  Bulgaria 





Vemex  33  RWE 
Transgas 
ZMB (33%), Austria’s Centrex 
(33%) 
Estonia  Eesti Gaas  37.02  Eesti Gaas  E.ON Ruhrgas (33.66%), 
Fortum Oyj (17.72%), Itera 
Latvija (9.85%) 
Gasum Oy  25  Fortum (31%), Finnish state 
(24%), E.ON Ruhrgas (20%) 
Finland 
North Transgas Oy  100 
Fortum 
— 
France  FRAgas Trading 
House 
50  GdF  GdF 
Ditgaz  49  n/a 
VNG (Verbundnetz 
Gas) 
5.26  EWE (47.9), VNG Verwaltung 
und Beteiligung (25.79), 
Wintershall (15.79), EEG–
Erdgas Transport (5.26) 
Gazprom Germania  100  — 
Wingas  50  Wintershall (50%) 
WIEH (Winthershall 
Erdgas Handelshaus) 
50  Wintershall (50%) 
ZGG (Zarubezhgas-
Erdgashandel) 
100  — 
Germany 








Greece  Prometheus Gaz  50  DEPA  n/a 
Hungary  Panrusgáz  40  MOL Gas  E.ON Ruhrgas (50%), Centrex 
Hungária (10%) 
Volta  49  Edison (51%)  Italy 





Latvia  Latvijas G
ā ze  25  Latvijas 
G
ā ze 
E.ON Ruhrgas (47.15%), Itera-
Latvija (25%) 
Lietuvos Dujos  37.1  E.ON Ruhrgas (38.9%), Lithu-
anian State (17.7%), 
individuals and legal entities 
(6.3%) 
Lithuania 




Netherlands  Peter-Gaz  51  Gasunie  n/a 
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  BSPC (Blue Stream 
Pipeline Company) 
50    ENI (50%) 
EuroPol Gaz  48  PGNiG (48%), Gas-Trading 
(4%) 
Poland 
Gas-Trading  35 
PGNiG 
n/a 
Wirom  25.5*  Distrigaz Sud (49%)  Romania 
WIEE Romania  50* 
SNTGN 
Transgaz  n/a 
Slovakia  Slovrusgas  50  SPP  SPP (50%) 




50  Wintershall (50%) 
ZMB, Switzerland  100  — 
Switzerland 
Nord Stream AG  51 
Swissgas 
E.ON Ruhrgas (20%), 





100  —  United 
Kingdom 
Interconnector  10 
BG Group 
BG Group (25%), E.ON 
Ruhrgas (23.59%), Distrigas 
(16.41%), ConocoPhillips 
(10%), Total (10%), ENI (5%) 









Table 2: Downstream prices q in cent/kwh, Russia’s upstream price pR and security 
of supply 1-a for different numbers m of producers (plus Russia) and traders n. Case: 
Russia is not a trader. 
 
m  1  2  3  4 
n             
1  6.16  5.88  5.67  5.55 
2  5.21  4.84  4.56  4.40 
3  4.74  4.32  4.01  3.83 
4  4.46  4.01  3.67  3.48 
5  4.27  3.80  3.45  3.25 
6  4.13  3.65  3.29  3.09 
7  4.03  3.54  3.17  2.96 
8  3.95  3.45  3.08  2.87 
9  3.89  3.38  3.01  2.79 
pR  3.32  2.76  2.34  2.1 
1 - a  0.993  0.977  0.955  0.928 
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Table 3: Price differences q – q’ with q’(q) = downstream price if Russia is (not) a 
trader. 
 
m  1  2  3  4 
n             
1  2.22  2.16  2.06  2.01 
2  1.59  1.54  1.43  1.36 
3  1.31  1.27  1.15  1.08 
4  1.15  1.11  0.98  0.91 
 
Table 4: Differences of security of supply (1 - a’) – (1 - a) = a - a’ with a’(a) = 
probability of interruption if Gazprom is (not) a trader. 
 
m  1  2  3  4 
n             
1  0.005  0.020  0.041  0.067 
2  0.003  0.015  0.035  0.060 
3  0.001  0.011  0.028  0.051 
4  0.000  0.007  0.021  0.042 
 
 